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Chapter 14: "From Liberation to Occupation"

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427 head of the Coalition Provisional Authority: President Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer as Presidential Envoy to Iraq. See Statement by the Press Secretary, “President Names Envoy to Iraq,” White House, May 6, 2006. Rumsfeld then designated Bremer “as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, with the title of Administrator.” See Rumsfeld Memo to Bremer, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.

428 “intimately linked to the regime”: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq: The Day After, October 18, 2002, p. 1, cited in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq Together with Additional Views, [undated, publicly released on May 25, 2007], pp. 100–101 of 226.

428 “eliminate the Ba’ath party oversight mechanism”: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Iraqi Ba’th Party: Inexorably Tied to Saddam, October 31, 2002, p. 2, cited in U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Prewar Intelligence Assessments About Postwar Iraq Together with Additional Views, p. 101 of 226.

428 the necessity for substantial de-Baathification: U.S. Department of State, Future of Iraq Project [2005]. (The Future of Iraq meetings were held June 2002–April 2003.) The Democratic Principles and Procedures Working Group states in its report that the tasks of the transitional government should include “De-Ba’athification of the institutions of government.” It goes on to state that “the liberation of Iraq from a regime which is totalitarian in its nature will not be complete or effective without dismantling the structures of control exercised by the Ba’ath Party, as an institution as well as an ideology, over Iraqi society. A program of de-Ba’athification of all facets of Iraqi life has therefore to be put into effect, aiming towards a disengagement of the party presence and control from all institutions of Iraqi society.”

429 issuing CPA Order No. 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society”: See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003.

429 this de-Baathification order was scorned: See David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess”; Thomas Ricks, “In Iraq, Military Forgot Lessons of Vietnam,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006, p. A01; General Anthony Zinni (USMC, retired), “Equal Time: Restore regular Iraqi army to assist with reconstruction,” Atlanta Journal- Constitution, February 5, 2004, p. 15A.

429 Others have taken the opposite position: See, e.g., Reuel Marc Gerecht, “On Democracy in Iraq,” The Weekly Standard, April 30, 2007; Victor Davis Hanson, “Stasis or Victory?,” National Review Online, January 5, 2007; Interview with Kanan Mikiya by Sam Spector, January 26, 2005, published in the Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005.

431 Bremer eventually delegated the de-Baathification process: See Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 7, “Delegation of Authority Under De- Baathification Order No. 1,” November 4, 2003.

431 Bremer has written that this was an error: See L. Paul Bremer III, “What We Got Right in Iraq,” Washington Post, May 13, 2007, p. B1; Interview with L. Paul Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline, PBS, conducted on June 26 and August 18, 2006.

431 would feel betrayed: Brian Bennett, “Sorting the Bad from the Not-So-Bad,” Time, May 11, 2003.

432 whole units could have been reassembled: See Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 428–430; Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess.”

432 Shiite leaders, he says, would have stopped cooperating: Bremer, “What We Got Right in Iraq,” p. B1. See also Interview with Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline.

 

432 “employees and retirees of the dissolved entities”: Bremer Memo to Rumsfeld, “Dissolution of the Ministry of Defense and Related Entities,” May 19, 2003.

433 Bremer issued CPA Order No. 2: See Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003. I have no record of Rumsfeld’s response to Bremer’s May 19 memo on dissolution. (The official CPA website (http://www.cpa-iraq.org/) gives August 23, 2003, as the date of CPA Order No. 2. The order itself, however, shows the date as May 23, 2003. The error may reflect a misreading of Bremer’s handwritten date on the document: The “5,” representing the month of May, looks like an “8.”)

433 properly reasoned through by Bremer and Slocombe: See Bremer, “What We Got Right in Iraq,” p. B1; Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 53–59; Walter B. Slocombe, “To Build an Army,” Washington Post, November 5, 2003, p. A29; Interview with Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline.

 

434 would be paid monthly stipends: Coalition Provisional Authority, Press Release, “Good News for Iraqi Soldiers,” June 23, 2003.

434 protecting fixed sites and convoy escorts: Coalition Provisional Authority, Briefing Slides, “New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Concept,” June 3, 2003.

435 out of the role of military occupier: In his book, Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, Washington Post reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran argues that the occupation was a mistake and criticizes the Administration for ignoring the advice of experienced State Department Middle East experts. Dan Senor, a CPA official, responded: The argument that the Administration should have moved quickly “to empower a full, sovereign Iraqi government” was “precisely the policy that was vociferously opposed by the State Department’s Middle East experts.” Indeed, Senor points out, “the approach Chandrasekaran now claims to prefer has much more in common with the rapid political transition plan backed by the very Pentagon neoconservatives he disparages throughout his account.” Dan Senor, “The Realities of Trying to Rebuild Iraq,” Washington Post, October 10, 2006, p. A21.

436 within a month or two of the regime’s removal: See OSD Policy, “Iraq Interim Authority Implementation Plan,” April 29, 2003.

437 “give us your recommendation”: See Interview with Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline: “My impressions from my meetings in Washington in early May, and very clearly from a meeting at the NSC [National Security Council], was that we were to take our time and put the Iraqis on a path to democracy, and that this would take time. We were not to rush to [appoint an] interim government.”

437 “work with the process we had set up”: David Sedney [assistant to Zalmay Khalilzad] Fax to McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, Pace, and Armitage, “Khalilzad/Baghdad Meeting,” May 1, 2003. The principal Iraqi leaders at that meeting were Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord, Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, Abdulaziz el-Hakim of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

437 transitional Iraqi “government” near the end of May: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Briefing Paper for Rumsfeld, “Read Ahead for PC [Principals Committee meeting] on IIA [Iraqi Interim Authority],” May 3, 2003.

437 On May 5, Garner announced to journalists: See Carol Morello, “‘Nucleus’ of Iraqi Leaders Emerges; Occupation Chief Outlines Plan for Interim Authority,” Washington Post, May 6, 2003, p. A1 (emphasis added); Patrick E. Tyler, “Aftereffects: Postwar Rule; Opposition Groups to Help to Create Assembly in Iraq,” New York Times, May 6, 2003, p. 1.

439 “hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis”: Interview with Bremer, “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline.

 

441 President Bush appointed him Presidential Envoy: President Bush letter to Bremer, [no subject line], May 9, 2003.

441 as the new head of the CPA: Rumsfeld Memo to Bremer, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003 (unclassified).

442 my staff suggested a daily secure video: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Briefing Paper, “Support for the Presidential Envoy to Iraq,” May 13, 2003.

443 his “first impressions” memo of May 22, 2003: Bremer Memo to President Bush, [no title], May 22, 2003, reprinted on nytimes.com. The memo has the May 22 date at the top but a May 20, 2003, date under Bremer’s signature block.

444 Zebari later observed: Robert L. Pollock, “The Voice of Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2006, p. A10.

446 “agreed by all the people”: Bremer Memo to President Bush , [no title], May 22, 2003.

446 in a memo to Rumsfeld the next day: Bremer Memo to Rumsfeld, “The ‘Fast-Slow’ Approach to the Creation of an Interim Administration,” May 23, 2003.

447 holding national elections would take two years: Chris Straub Memo to William Luti, “Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) Plans for Iraqi Governance,” June 2, 2003 (FOUO).

447 deciding how to try to fund them: The problem of funding made every problem more difficult. I argued for an approach that would frontload the reconstruction budget, on the assumption that the initial needs would be disproportionately large. [Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy] briefing, “‘Jump Up,’ Don’t ‘Ramp Up,’ ” July 19, 2003.

447 “principal body of the Iraqi interim administration”: See Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 6, “Governing Council of Iraq,” July 13, 2003. The regulation describes the process in these terms: The Governing Council “met and announced its formation.”

448 a nine-person, monthly rotating presidency: The nine members elected to the rotational leadership group were: Jaafari, Chalabi, Allawi, Talabani, Hakim, Pachachi, Hamid, Bahr al-Uloum, and Barzani. See Bremer Memo to Rumsfeld, “CPA Issues,” July 30, 2003.

453 “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty”: L. Paul Bremer III, “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty,” Washington Post, September 8, 2003, p. A21. 

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