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Feith presents genuine scholarship, an interesting and original argument concerning 9/11, American actions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the general war on terror, and a valuable behind-the-scenes look at the way in which foreign policy, defense and national security policy was made during the course of the Bush Administration.

Pejman Yousefzadeh

Redstate.com

. . .  In War and Decision, Feith offers a dispassionate counterresponse-the first,
one can only hope, of others to follow from Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz,
and George W. Bush. Feith is not interested in getting even, but rather in
systematically exploring the accuracy of the entire pessimistic narrative
that has grown up about Iraq. Although he does not question every detail, he
subjects enough of the narrative to cross-examination to show that it is
largely a myth. His tools are understated irony and extensive
documentation-some 600 footnotes and dozens of reprinted documents. These
bring forcefully to view what the Bush administration was actually thinking
in the days, weeks, and months after 9/11.
As the record adduced by Feith clearly demonstrates, neither he nor Rumsfeld
advocated a preemptive war for democracy. Feith was more interested in
simply removing dictators like the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power
before they or their surrogates could trump the horrors of 9/11, while
Rumsfeld was almost obsessive in his anxiety over mounting costs, unforeseen
battlefield complications, and occupations with no predetermined end. Far
from wanting an imperial American presence in Iraq, Pentagon officials
wished to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis as quickly as possible-unlike
their counterparts in the State Department, and unlike Paul Bremer, whose
quest for the perfect constitutional government got in the way of
implementing an interim governing body that would have been good enough.
Powell and Armitage-as the record also demonstrates-were neither critics nor
supporters of the war, but had carefully situated themselves to be for it if
it worked, and against it if it did not. Their studied triangulation meant
that when things went well they were never enthusiastic advocates of the
policies they were charged with overseeing, while when things turned bad
they were ready to provide off-the-record quotes and background information
to the growing chorus of antiwar critics. . . .

Victor David Hanson

Commentary Magazine

Secretary Powell was not antiwar so much as inscrutable, in Feith's telling.
He agreed that Saddam Hussein was dangerous but downplayed the urgency of
the threat. At best, he supported the administration's Iraq policy
halfheartedly, without outlining an alternative solution.
"Powell put himself in a position where, if the war went well, he could say
he supported it, and, if not, he could point to his warnings as proof that
he was a prescient dove," writes Feith.

Peter Grier

Christian Science Monitor

Feith draws on countless internal documents, many of which were intended for, written by, or debated among members of the president’s Cabinet, the most senior advisers to Cabinet officials, and the president himself. Feith has performed a public service by taking the time to present these documents, which have gone through the painstaking process of official declassification, in nearly 600 citations that are reproduced online with links to full texts, transcripts, and presentations. (To pick another insider account by comparison, George Tenet’s At the Center of the Storm offers, well, zero documents, citations, or footnotes).

Larry DiRita

National Review Online

“The best account to date of how the administration debated, decided, organized and executed its military responses to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Much of what makes War and Decision so compelling is that it is, in effect, a revisionist history. Much to Mr. Feith’s credit, however, his book is no apologia, even for those he obviously admires. . . . Indispensable.”

Bret Stephens

Wall Street Journal

“It has just become considerably easier to understand the history of the decision to make Iraq a central front in the larger War for the Free World and to dissect what was and was not done right. Today marks the publication of an extraordinary new book on the subject. . . . I was unprepared for the thoroughness of the documentation, the sweeping nature of the narrative and the highly readable prose. It is the first attempt by a serious student of history to lay out the myriad, challenging choices confronting a president. . . . Splendid.”

Frank Gaffney, Jr.

The Washington Times

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