Chapter 9: Iraq Planning -- The Who and the Why

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275 would be joyous and trouble-free: See, e.g., Joseph L. Galloway, Jonathan S. Landay, Warren P. Strobel, and John Walcott, “Postwar planning for Iraq ‘ignored’; Insiders say the White House failed to develop a realistic strategy for winning the peace. Lack of plan to rebuild undermines Iraq effort,” Philadelphia Inquirer, October 17, 2004, p. A1.

276 Casey created an interagency group: See Joint Staff Briefing, “Iraq Pol-Mil Cell: Concept, Mission, and Tasks,” July 10, 2002.

276 efforts tucked in under the Executive Steering Group: The Humanitarian Reconstruction Group was cochaired by Elliott Abrams of the NSC staff and Robin Cleveland of the Office of Management and Budget; it also included members from State, Defense, the CIA, the Office of the Vice President, Treasury, Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Energy Infrastructure Working Group, chaired by Michael Mobbs of my Policy organization, included members from State, the Joint Staff, the CIA, and Energy. The Coalition Working Group included members from State and Defense. See “Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq”; Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Reconstruction in Iraq, July 29, 2003.

277 claimed that my office served as “Chalabi’s handler”: See, e.g., the especially inaccurate article by a former DIA official: W. Patrick Lang, “Drinking the Kool-Aid,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer 2004).

277 “Diplomatic Plan for the Day After”: State Department policy paper, “Diplomatic Plan for the Day After,” [undated], distributed by Richard Armitage at Deputies Lunch, July 25, 2002.

277 the Administration’s strategy for Iraq: In some of its assessments, the CIA, too, warned against an extended occupation:

"Iraq’s history of foreign occupation . . . has left Iraqis with a deep dislike of occupiers. An indefinite foreign military occupation, with ultimate power in the hands of a non-Iraqi officer, would be widely unacceptable."

National Intelligence Council, “Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,” January 2003, p. 10. Redacted and reproduced as Appendix B of Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq, [undated], released May 25, 2007.  

277 Armitage’s other paper: This second State Department policy paper was entitled “The Future of Iraq.” Undated, it was distributed by Richard Armitage at the Deputies Lunch on July 25, 2002. It was a three-page paper and should not be confused with the voluminous set of concept papers later produced at State with the same overall title. (Emphasis added in quoted text.)

279 proposal for military training of Iraqi oppositionists: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Near East and South Asia Affairs Office, Briefing entitled “Action Plan to Train and Equip the Iraqi Opposition in Support of Military Operations to Liberate Iraq,” July 26, 2002.

281 opposition conferences held in the 1990s: See SSCI Report on Chalabi Group, p. 6.

283 Political-Military Strategic Plan for Iraq: Joint Staff Briefing, “Iraq: Political-Military Strategic Plan,” June 28, 2002.

283 at the August 6 Principals Committee meeting: [National Security Council Staff ], “Liberation Strategy for Iraq,” August 5, 2002, distributed by Condoleezza Rice for August 6, 2002, Principals Committee meeting, four pages.

288 “based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy”: [National Security Council Staff], “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy,” August 14, 2002.

292 “immediately promote civil order”: Iraq Political-Military Cell, “Post-War Strategy,” Briefing for Principals Meeting, October 23, 2002.

292 initiated as early as possible in the planning process: General Richard B. Myers, Planning Order for General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command, July 9, 2002 (emphasis added).

292 “and strategic military objectives”: Iraq Political-Military Cell, Joint Staff J-5 Directorate, “Review of CENTCOM ‘Hybrid Start’ CONPLAN,” Information Paper, September 6, 2002.

292 “complex Phase IV requirements”: Joint Staff, “Prominent Hammer II Initial Insights,” September 26, 2002.

292 “refine planning for Phase IV operations”: General Richard B. Myers, Planning Order for General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command, December 19, 2002 (emphasis added).

293 for all aspects of governing Iraq: CENTCOM’s comprehensive responsibility for post-Saddam Iraq was reiterated in various contexts. I made the point in congressional testimony (Douglas J. Feith, “Post-War Planning,” Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003); Rumsfeld made the point in a Principals’ Committee meeting on Post-War Governance (March 1, 2003).

293 On January 10, 2003, Rumsfeld directed Giambastiani: General Richard B. Myers, Execute Order, January 10, 2003.

294 “consumer, rather than producer, of intelligence”: Douglas J. Feith Letter to Senator John Warner, Chair of Senate Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2003. The letter clarified:

"[T]he team had nothing to do with the “Intelligence Collection Program” (ICP), which was transferred from the State Department to the Defense Humint Service. [The Office of] Special Plans was created in October 2002 by expanding the Near East and South Asia Bureau’s Northern Gulf section, in order to provide enough manpower to handle policy issues with respect to Iran, Iraq and the Global War on Terrorism."

298 a greater threat from hostile neighbors: These paragraphs are drawn verbatim from that August 2002 paper. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Sovereignty and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” August 24, 2002, four pages (emphasis in original).

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