Chapter 2: Personal Trajectory

Citations by page number

24 “marginal advantage” over each other: See Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1972), pp. 393–398, 400–402.

31 a series of articles: See, e.g., Douglas J. Feith, “The Oil Weapon De-Mystified,” Policy Review, Winter 1981; Douglas J. Feith, “Saudi Production Cutback: An Empty Threat,” Wall Street Journal, March 30, 1981.

39 “their right of self-determination”: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) (opened for signature in 1977), Articles 1(4) and 44(3).

39 “The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol”: Douglas J. Feith, “Law in the Service of Terror: The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol,” The National Interest 1 (Fall 1985), pp. 36–47.

40 “legitimacy as international actors”: Ronald Reagan, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluding at Geneva on June 10, 1977 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Senate Treaty Doc. 100–2, January 29, 1987), p. iv.

40 “have read that as legitimizing terrorists”: Editorial, “Denied: A Shield for Terrorists,” New York Times, February 17, 1987, p. A22.

40 “for progress in humanitarian law”: Editorial, “Hijacking the Geneva Conventions,” Washington Post, February 18, 1987, p. A18.

41 sing a different tune: Nicholas D. Kristof, “Let Them Be P.O.W.’s,” New York Times, January 29, 2002, A21; Editorial, “Bending the Geneva Rules,” Washington Post, February 10, 2002, p. B06.

44 cut off support for al Qaida: In an August 24, 2001, memo from my office to Wolfowitz, we summarized our thoughts on Afghanistan as follows:

"The Taliban regime presents several threats to US national interests in the Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia and beyond:

    • Harboring and supporting Usama bin Laden;
    • Sponsoring insurgency in Uzbekistan;
    • Opium production and trafficking;
    • Condoning or perpetuating widespread human, ethnic, religious and gender abuses;
    • Serving as a model for discontented populations of other Islamic states; and
    • Impeding the advancement of a negotiated settlement to Afghanistan’s own civil war.

"Options include maintaining the status quo, working to install a US-or coalition-backed government, backing the Northern Alliance, or recognizing the Taliban. All would require substantial regional support and entail significant diplomatic initiative."

44 pay for the operation: See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004, pp. 210–212. Later published as The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).

46 wants Russia to succeed: Donald H. Rumsfeld, informal notes on “Discussions with Russia,” July 12, 2001, 12:08 p.m.

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