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Chapter 7: Risks of Action and Inaction

215 No one I know of believed Saddam was part of the 9/11 plot: The Administration did not claim that Iraq had sponsored or supported the attacks of 9/11. Both Tenet and Cheney called attention to the record of Saddam’s interaction with al Qaida as signaling potential future collaboration. According to Cheney:

"We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the ’90s, that it involved training, for example, on BW and CW, that al-Qaeda sent personnel to Baghdad to get trained on the systems that are involved. The Iraqis providing bomb-making expertise and advice to the al-Qaeda organization. We know, for example, in connection with the original World Trade Center bombing in ’93 that one of the bombers was Iraqi, returned to Iraq after the attack of ’93. And we’ve learned subsequent to that, since we went into Baghdad and got into the intelligence files, that this individual probably also received financing from the Iraqi government as well as safe haven. . . . The Czechs alleged that Mohamed Atta, the lead attacker, met in Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know."

Tim Russert interview with Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 14, 2003. Historians will be hard-pressed to find substantial support for the current widespread belief that Cheney (or other Administration officials) hammered on the Iraq–al Qaida connection. Tenet told the U.S. Senate:

"Iraq is harboring senior members of a terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close associate of al Qaeda. . . . Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful. . . . I know that part of this—and part of this Zarqawi network in Baghdad are two dozen Egyptian Islamic jihad which is indistinguishable from al Qaeda—operatives who are aiding the Zarqawi network, and two senior planners who have been in Baghdad since last May. Now, whether there is a base or whether there is not a base, they are operating freely, supporting the Zarqawi network that is supporting the poisons network in Europe and around the world. . . . And it is inconceivable to us that the Iraqi intelligence service doesn’t know that they live there or what they’re doing."

George Tenet, Testimony before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003.

215 dealing with terrorists and terrorist organizations: The Fedayeen Saddam opened camps in 1994 to train thousands of volunteers, “graduating more than 7,200 . . . in the first year.” Beginning in 1998, the Fedayeen also trained “Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, ‘the Gulf,’ and Syria” (quotation from a captured Iraqi regime document). Where the Arab volunteers went after their training remains unclear. The Fedayeen had assistance from the Iraqi Intelligence Service, whose Division 27 “supplied the Fedayeen Saddam with silencers, equipment for booby-trapping vehicles, special training on the use of certain explosive devices, special molds for explosives, and a variety of explosive timers. . . . The only apparent use for all of this Division 27 equipment was to conduct commando or terrorist operations.” Woods, et al., The Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 54.

216 expectation of further major terrorist attacks remained widespread: See Karlyn Bowman, AEI Studies in Public Opinion: America and the War on Terrorism, updated November 29, 2007.

217 “dire consequences of a BW attack” : “Dark Winter—Bioterrorism Simulation Exercise,” developed and produced by Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, conducted June 22–23, 2001. Among the participants: former senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), former Governor of Oklahoma Frank Keating, former CIA Director James Woolsey, former FBI Director William Sessions, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John White.  (Italics in original.)

217 We knew Saddam’s weapons scientists had been researching: “ISG concludes that Iraq intended to develop smallpox . . . as potential BW weapons. . . . ISG assesses that Iraq maintained the capability in its personnel and basic equipment to conduct R&D into viral agents including smallpox” Duelfer Report, Vol. IIIB, “Biological Warfare”.

218 had done work on anthrax: Duelfer Report, IIIB, pp. 5, 10. The FBI initially asserted that the anthrax spores had been produced in a U.S. government laboratory, but in September 2006 the FBI investigation was extended to include international and nongovernment sources. Allan Lengel and Joby Warrick, “FBI Is Casting a Wider Net in Anthrax Attacks,” Washington Post, September 25, 2006.

219 for Iraqi democratic opposition groups: Feith Memo to Rumsfeld, Action Plan for Next Steps on Possible Moves on Iraq, November 8, 2001.

220 gave the Secretary a set of rough notes: Typewritten notes by Feith labeled “Iraq war planning focus on WMD,” November 27, 2001, annotated in pen by Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld’s annotations borrowed points from an earlier Wolfowitz markup of this draft. This was typical of way ideas were exchanged within Rumsfeld’s inner circle.

222 had generally agreed since the mid-1990s: The following are representative examples:

• “There is no doubt that . . . Saddam Hussein has invigorated his weapons programs. Reports indicate that biological, chemical and nuclear programs continue apace and may be back to pre-Gulf War status.” Letter to President Bush, signed by Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida) and others, December 5, 2001.

• “We begin with the common belief that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant and a threat to the peace and stability of the region. He has ignored the mandate of the United Nations and is building weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them.” Press Release, Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan), September 19, 2002.

• “Iraq’s search for weapons of mass destruction has proven impossible to deter and we should assume that it will continue for as long as Saddam is in power.” Al Gore, September 23, 2002, speech before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco.

• “We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction.” Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), September 27, 2002, speech before the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.

• “According to the CIA’s report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons.” Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts), Congressional Record, October 9, 2002, pp. S10170– S10175.

223 shooting at the patrol aircraft almost every day: General Myers reported that the patrol aircraft had been fired on 2,300 times in two and a half years. “United States Policy Toward Iraq,” Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, September 18, 2002.

224 “the rationale for this work was not given”: The Iraq Survey Group determined that camel pox research was “a surrogate for smallpox research.” Duelfer Report, IIIB, Biological Weapons. See also United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), “Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring,” January 29, 1999. (Hereafter, UNSCOM Report.)

224 produce his own fissile material domestically: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Mass Destruction,” October 2002, p. 5 (approved for release April 2004). Hereafter, NIE October 2002.

226 “if Iraq has done so”: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 1999.”

226 “at any time, if needed”: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2000” (emphasis added).

226 “no evidence Iraq used this capability for BW production”: Duelfer Report, IIIB, p. 38.

227 “2 to 3 weeks after the decision to do so”: Ibid., p. 42. The Iraqi Perspectives Project concluded: “Even when viewed through the post-war lens, documentary evidence of messages are consistent with the Iraqi Survey Group’s conclusion that Saddam was at least keeping a WMD program primed for a quick re-start the moment the UN Security Council lifted sanctions.” Woods et al., The Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 95.

227 “lay the foundations of a BW program”: Duelfer Report, IIIB, pp. 2, 5 (italics in original).

227 active rather than dormant: “We judge that all key aspects—R&D, production, and weaponization—of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War. We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. . . . Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year.” National Intelligence Estimate, October 2002, p. 6.

228 Silberman-Robb Commission criticized the CIA: See Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 158. (Hereafter, Silberman-Robb Commission.)

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