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Chapter 6: Why Iraq?

182 to replace that regime: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, Public Law No. 105-338 (October 31, 1998), Section 3.

182 “Kerry . . . and others had sent a letter to President Clinton”: Letter of the Senate Armed Services Committee to President Clinton, October 9, 1998.

182 if compliance is not achieved: Carl Levin, “Concern Over Recent Developments in Iraq,” Congressional Record, U.S. Senate, October 9, 1998, p. S12240.

182 rebuilding its weapons of mass destruction: Editorial, “Facing Up to Iraq,” Washington Post, January 29, 2001, p. A18.

182 one Times editorial said: Editorial, “Eliminating Hidden Weapons; Illusory Inspections in Iraq,” New York Times, August 28, 1998, p. A24.

182 “eager to ease inspections and sanctions”: Editorial, “Drifting to a New Iraq Policy,” New York Times, August 12, 1998, p. A18.

182 “is destined to be weak”: Editorial, “No Illusions About Iraq,” New York Times, December 27, 1998, p. A18 .

184 used chemical weapons against Iran: In the note to the UN Security Council by UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar accompanying the report of the special mission, the secretary-general confirmed that Iraq did use chemical weapons against Iran and, in doing so, violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol (on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare). See paragraph 14 of UN Security Council document S/17911 (“Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq S/17911,” March 12, 1986). For the observation that the Iraqi regime was the first in history to make such use of nerve gas, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Update: Chemical Warfare Agent Issues During the Persian Gulf War, April 2002.

185 to pour into the Persian Gulf: See “Saddam Hussein: Crimes and Human Rights Abuses,” United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, November 2002, pp. 18–22, 29; Timothy J. Feighery, “Conference Papers: 3. The Impact on the Economic and Social Fabric Assessing the Costs of Iraq’s 1990 Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait—The United Nations Compensation Commission,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 22 (December 2003), pp. 88, 94; The Economic and Environmental Impact of the Gulf War on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, The Trade & Environment Database.

186 “that threatened the regime’s survival”: Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project : A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command March 2006, pp. viii, 14–16.

186 humanitarian needs (mainly food and medicine): United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, 1991, cited January 12, 2007.

186 culture of the “marsh Arabs”: See CIA, “Facts on Iraq’s Humanitarian Situation,” July 17, 1998, p. 19. 

186 another resolution, directing Iraq to cease oppressing its own civilians: United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 688, April 5, 1991.

187 with a car bomb: The Kuwaitis caught the team of failed assassins, which was led by Iraqi nationals. See White House, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” September 12, 2002, p. 18.

187 “a long history of supporting terrorism”: CIA, Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002, as summarized in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 7, 2004, p. 314. (Hereafter, SSCI Report on Iraq Prewar Intelligence.) See Chapter 8.

187 families of Palestinian suicide bombers: In 2002, he pledged $25,000 per family to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers: “The rules for rewarding suicide/ homicide bombers are strict and insist that only someone who blows himself up with a belt of explosives gets the full payment.” White House, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” September 12, 2002, p. 18.

Saddam paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers to encourage Palestinian terrorism, channeling $25,000 since March through the ALF alone to families of suicide bombers in Gaza and the West Bank. Public testimonials by Palestinian civilians and officials and cancelled checks captured by Israel in the West Bank verify the transfer of a considerable amount of Iraqi money. U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,” April 30, 2003. See also “Saddam spends millions to win allies in Jenin,” London Daily Telegraph, May 30, 2002.

187 including many Americans: Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy: CRS Report to Congress Updated December 10, 2002.

187 bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993: Yasin was imprisoned by Saddam after the first year while the regime attempted to negotiate the conditions of his transfer to U.S. custody, according to a CBS News interview conducted in the Iraqi prison. “The Yasin Interview: A 60 Minutes Exclusive,” 60 Minutes, CBS News, June 2, 2002.

187 Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly American: Abbas was captured outside Baghdad by U.S. Special Forces in April 2003. “U.S. captures mastermind of Achille Lauro hijacking,” CNN, April 16, 2003.

187 Arab Liberation Front (ALF): See U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” May 2002, p. 65; White House, “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” September 12, 2002, p. 18.

188 Saddam brought Arab volunteers. . . to those camps for training: Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 54 (endnotes omitted). The cited Iraqi regime document was dated October 7, 2000, and was entitled “Correspondence from Presidential Office to Secretary General of the Fedayeen Saddam Regarding Foreign Arab Volunteers.” Ibid., note 54, p. 68.

188 “test various chemicals and poisons”: Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, Vol. IIIB, “Biological Warfare,” p. 15; Ibid., Vol. IIIA, “Chemical Warfare,” p. 3. (Hereafter, Duelfer Report)

188 “enhance its military capability in southern Iraq”: United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 949, October 15, 1992.

188 of southern Iraq’s no-fly zone: U.S. Department of State, “Timeline of UN Iraq-Coalition Activity,” February 25, 2003.

188 “deployed biological weapons for combat use”: United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), “Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring,” January 29, 1999.

188 “a surrogate for smallpox research”: Charles Duelfer, Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004, Vol. IIIB, “Biological Warfare,” pp. 27 (in original, the quoted words were all in italics).

190 replacing the Saddam Hussein regime with a democratic government: See Ahmad Chalabi, “A Democratic Future for Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1991, p. A10.

190 “as its very center the armed forces”: John Lancaster and David B. Ottaway, “With CIA’s Help, Group in Jordan Targets Saddam; U.S. Funds Support Campaign to Topple Iraqi Leader from Afar,” Washington Post, June 23, 1996, p. A1. In June 2004, Allawi became Prime Minister of the first post-Saddam Iraqi government.

190 denounced the CIA for incompetence: See Robert Baer, See No Evil (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), pp. 200–205; David Ignatius, “The CIA and the Coup That Wasn’t,” Washington Post, May 16, 2003.

190 “not a U.S. intelligence asset”: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress together with Additional Views, September 8, 2006, p. 7. (Hereafter, SSCI Report on the Chalabi Group.)

191 reminiscent of the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco: Both Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz invoked the Bay of Pigs in their criticism of the CIA’s failure in northern Iraq. See Newt Gingrich, “In the Absence of Clarity and Consistency,” Washington Times, September 23, 1996, p. A17; Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz before the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19, 1996, available through http://www.nexis.com; Nightline, ABC News, September 10, 1996 (transcript #3992–1).

192 “. . . CIA asset’s three children”: Ibid., p. 24. A former CIA official summarizes the story this way:

"One of the principal reasons the clandestine service’s Near East Division loathes Chalabi is that he tried to warn [CIA headquarters] that its coup d’étât plans with the Iraqi National Accord . . . had been thoroughly penetrated by Saddam. . . . When Saddam tore the INA scheme apart, Chalabi became one of [the CIA’s] least favorite people."

Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Liberate Iraq,” Weekly Standard, May 14, 2001, p. 23. See also David Ignatius, “The CIA and the Coup that Wasn’t,” Washington Post, May 16, 2003.

192 negotiated the Oil-for-Food (OFF) Program with Iraq: The Oil-for-Food resolution, passed almost a year earlier, was initially rejected by Iraq. The program was finally implemented with a Memorandum of Understanding that gave Iraq some authority over its administration. UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995, UN Security Council. See also President William J. Clinton, Report to the Congress of the United States on the National Emergency in Iraq, February 4, 1998.

192 including militarily relevant goods: As far back as September 25, 1996, CIA Director John Deutch told a congressional committee: “Saddam’s family profits from covert sales of Iraqi oil and dominance of the black market, where many of the donated medicines and food end up.” Testimony of John Deutch before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, September 25, 1996, available through http://www.nexis.com. Such covert sales were only one of a number of ways that Saddam undermined the Oil-for-Food program. See Claudia Rossett, “Oil, Food and a Whole Lot of Questions,” New York Times, April 18, 2003.

192 described the pattern of abuse: Charles Duelfer, Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 6, 2004, p. 3. (Hereafter, Duelfer Testimony.)

193 “resolutions passed by the Security Council”: Duelfer Testimony, p. 3. See also Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, pp. 28–29; Claudia Rosett, “What’s ‘Illegal’?” Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2004; Claudia Rosett, “Oil-for-Terror?” National Review Online, April 18, 2004.

193 “by the end of 1999”: Duelfer Report, Vol. I, “Regime Intent”: Key Findings.

193 crimped his military supply lines: See Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 41.

194 “predict the Commission’s inspection activities”: The report also cites “outright lying, evasiveness, intimidation, forging of documents, misrepresentation of sites and personnel, the denial of access to individuals and the issue of successive [accounts] that were fraudulent”—as well as “direct evidence of Mukhabarat involvement.” United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), “Report on Status of Disarmament and Monitoring,” January 29, 1999.

194 But Saddam was determined to prevent the inspectors: See Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, pp. 91–95.

195 letter to President Clinton signed by eighteen individuals: Project for a New American Century, Open Letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998.

195 another open letter to President Clinton: Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, Open Letter to President Clinton, February 19, 1998.

196 $97 million worth of military education and training: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, H.R. 4655, Public Law No. 105–338 (October 31, 1998).

196 “are U.S. policy”: Congressional Record, 105th Congress, 2nd Session (October 7, 1998), P. S11812 (emphasis added).

197 “under the current Iraq leadership”: Statement by President Clinton on the Iraq Liberation Act, October 31, 1998, White House.

197 Chalabi championed the measure on Capitol Hill: See James Risen and Barbara Crossette, “Even U.S. Sees Iraq Opposition as Faint Hope,” New York Times, November 19, 1998, p. A1.

197 the respect his organization had won: See, e.g.:

• Senator Trent Lott (R-Mississippi): “I have repeatedly stated that the Iraqi National Congress has been effective in the past and can be effective in the future. They represent the broadest possible base of the opposition.” Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina): “The bill requires the President to designate an Iraqi opposition group or groups to receive military drawdown assistance. The President need not look far; the Iraqi National Congress once flourished as an umbrella organization for Kurds, Shi’ites and Sunni Muslims. It should flourish again, but it needs our help.” “Establishing a Program to Support a Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” Congressional Record, U.S. Senate, October 7, 1998, pp. S11811–S11812.

• “It is for Iraqis, not Americans to organize themselves to put Saddam Hussein out of power, just as it will be for Iraqis to choose their leaders in a democratic Iraq. This bill will help the Administration encourage and support Iraqis to make their revolution.” Senator Robert Kerrey.

• “The overt support for political activities and broadcasting by opposition forces can have a significant impact inside Iraq. In addition, the committee of conference notes that disparate Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni groups have in the past been willing to set aside their differences and unite under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to effectively challenge Saddam Hussein. The committee of conference recommends supporting efforts to reunite these disparate groups under a unified umbrella, whether it be the INC or another opposition group, to present a solid, pro-democracy, Iraqi front against Saddam Hussein.” Conference Report, 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 105–432, U.S. House of Representatives, “Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act,” p. 165, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Sec. 1813 Support for Democratic Opposition in Iraq.

• “The managers expect that a significant portion of the support for the democratic opposition should go to the Iraqi National Congress, a group that has demonstrated the capacity to effectively challenge the Saddam Hussein regime with representation from Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish elements in Iraq.” Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 3579), 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 105–504, U.S. House of Representatives, “Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1998, and for Other Purposes,” p. 88, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, Sec. 10008 Support for Democratic Opposition in Iraq.

• “. . . not less than $8,000,000 shall be made available only for assistance to the Iraqi democratic opposition for such activities as organization, training, communication and dissemination of information, and developing and implementing agreements among opposition groups; . . . Provided further, that of this amount not less than $3,000,000 should be made available as a grant to the Iraqi National Congress, to be administered by its Executive Committee for the benefit of all constituent groups of the Iraqi National Congress. . . .” Conference Report (to accompany H.R. 4328), 105th Congress, 2nd Session, 105–825, p. 218, U.S. House of Representatives, “Making Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999,” Title IV, Sec. 590 Iraq Opposition.

197 the UN Security Council adopted: See United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1194, September 9, 1998. This resolution unanimously condemned Iraq’s decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and called Iraq’s actions a totally unacceptable contravention of Iraq’s obligations and United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1205 unanimously condemned Iraq’s actions and demanded that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally its decision not to cooperate with UNSCOM (Security Council Resolution 1205, November 5, 1998). Regarding UNSCOM’s withdrawal of its staff from Iraq on December 16, 1998, see United Nations Special Commission, “UNSCOM: Chronology of Main Events,” December 1999.

197 “made a mockery of the weapons inspection process”: Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-California), “Statement on U.S. Led Military Strike Against Iraq,” U.S. House of Representatives, December 16, 1998. Similar statements were made by other Democratic leaders: “Iraq is a long way from [here], but what happens there matters a great deal here. For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest security threat we face.” Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger at Town Hall Meeting, Ohio State University , February 18, 1998. “He will use those weapons of mass destruction again, as he has ten times since 1983.” 

197 the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC): See United Nations Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1284, December 17, 1999. This resolution replaced UNSCOM with UNMOVIC.

198 Iraq’s northern and southern no-fly zones: General Myers testified in September 2002 that the aircraft had been fired on 2,300 times in two and a half years. Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “United States Policy Toward Iraq,” Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, September 18, 2002. Aerial inspections also served to uphold UN Resolutions 687, 688, and 949.

199 “that moment cannot come too soon”: Gerald Butt, “Saddam Hussein Profile,” BBC News, January 4, 2001.

200 on which the Security Council built its containment strategy: In his September 2002 speech to the UN, President Bush underlined the challenge to the UN itself: The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant? George W. Bush, Speech to United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002.

210 our own memo, which we sent him on July 26: Feith memo to Rumsfeld, “Moving Ahead on Iraq,” July 26, 2001, which included a draft memo from Wolfowitz to Hadley with the same title (emphasis in original).

210 July 27, Rumsfeld signed it out to Rice, Powell, and Cheney: Rumsfeld memo to Rice on Iraq, July 27, 2001. Reproduced as Appendix 3.

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