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Chapter 3: Change The Way We Live, Or Change The Way They Live

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48 “to eliminate Iraqi threat”: [National Security Council staff], briefing slides for September 15–16, 2001, Camp David meetings (first slide entitled “Agenda”), undated, received on September 13, 2001.

50 “state support for that terrorism”: [Principal drafters: Peter W. Rodman and Douglas J. Feith], discussion paper on “War on Terrorism: Strategic Concept,” September 14, 2001, 2:15 p.m. (prepared for Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz). Note: In all quotations from written documents I have retained the spelling of names such as “Qaeda” or “Taleban” as used in the original. Such words were spelled variously throughout the U.S. government.

52 to defer such action against Iraq: See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 332–335.

55 than they otherwise might have: Rumsfeld memo to Shelton, “Some Thoughts for CINCs as They Prepare Plans,” September 19, 2001, 3:56 p.m.

56 In another memo he drafted that day: Rumsfeld memo to Tenet, Libby, Hughes, [No subject line or title], September 19, 2001, 3:13 p.m.

62 clashes between Powell and Rumsfeld: A “clash of style and politics, between the soldier and the conservative ideologue, that almost came to blows after a shouting match beneath the colonnades of the White House” (“The Day the World Changed Forever ,” The Observer, March 16, 2003); “[T]he grudge match between Powell and Rummy is one of the few dependable leitmotivs of the second Bush presidency” (Michael Duffy and Massimo Calabresi, “Clash of the Administration Titans,” Time, April 5, 2003).

62 mysteriously or conspiratorially achieved sway over the President: See, e.g., Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005); Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past ,” Washington Post, January 12, 2003, p. A01.

63 set down his thoughts about Franks’s briefing: Feith Draft Memo to Rumsfeld, “Briefing President on Operational Plan,” September 20, 2001, 8:50 p.m.

64 “not likely produce impressive results”: Feith Draft Memo to Rumsfeld, “Briefing President on Operational Plan,” September 20, 2001, 8:50 p.m.

67 The 9/11 Commission Report referred to this September 20 memo: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 559, note 75 to Chapter 10.

67 “didn’t seem to get it”: David Ignatius, “The Book on Terror ,” Washington Post Book World, August 1, 2004, p. T5.

67 calling attention to the conflict’s global nature: See Douglas J. Feith, “A War Plan That Cast a Wide Net ,” Washington Post, August 7, 2004, p. A21.

67 first major speech following the 9/11 attack: George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., September 20, 2001.

68 his speech received bipartisan approval: Both the Wall Street Journal and New York Times praised the speech in editorials. See “Rallying the country,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2001; “Mr. Bush’s Most Important Speech,” New York Times, September 21, 2001, p. A34. See also Dan Balz, “A resolute and focused call to arms,” Washington Post, September 21, 2001, p. A1; David E. Rosenbaum, “Congress Joins in Support of President ,” New York Times, September 21, 2001, p. B6. A rare critical voice was that of Representative Barney Franks (D-Massachusetts), who objected to the statement “God is not neutral.” Doyle McManus, “Bush Vows Firm ‘Justice,’ ” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 2001.

70 but throughout the country: This discussion of the stakes in the war on terrorism and the tension between civil liberties and fears for public safety draws on a March 3, 2005, speech I gave at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

75 “. . . on ‘Our Side’ of the Line”: Wolfowitz Memo to Rumsfeld, “Using Special Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the Line,” September 23, 2001.

79 military partnership with the Northern Alliance “will backfire”: Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” Foreign Affairs 80, No. 6 (November/ December 2001), pp. 17–30.

80 “failure of the bureaucracy to support policymakers”: Dana Priest, “CIA Officer Criticizes Agency’s Handling of Bin Laden ,” Washington Post, November 9, 2004, p. A28.

81 sent it to President Bush on September 30: Rumsfeld Memo to Bush, “Strategic Thoughts,” September 30, 2001.

83 “Very important aspect”: Abizaid Memo to Myers, “Wolfowitz/Feith Memo of 9/29/01,” September 29, 2001. General Myers sent this memo to me with a note he penned on it as follows: “Doug—J5 [Abizaid] thoughts on your paper, with my edits.”

84 Rumsfeld approved the Strategic Guidance on October 3: Rumsfeld memo to Wolfowitz, Secretaries of the Military Departments, and others, “Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism ,” October 3, 2001. This memo had attached to it the October 2, 2001, briefing slides, written by Lieutenant General Abizaid and me, entitled “CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM: Strategic Guidance for the US Department of Defense.” 

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