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Chapter 15: The Taint of Occupation

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457 compel Iraq’s new leaders to do things our way: Our public statements stressed U.S. respect for Iraqi sovereignty and promised that the CPA and U.S. forces would depart as soon as their missions were done. See, e.g., Douglas J. Feith, “Post-War Planning,” Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003; Douglas Feith, “Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,” Washington, D.C., July 7, 2003: “We are not interested in staying any longer than is required. We have no ambitions to control or dominate Iraq and will be very happy when our work is done and we can depart.”

458 run largely by current or former State officials: The leadership of the CPA was composed almost entirely of current or former State Department officials. For the list, see L. Paul Bremer III, “These Are Not Ideologues: The top officials during my time at the Coalition Provisional Authority,” Wall Street Journal OpinionJournal (For the Record), November 2, 2006.

460 He now had a set of strategic concepts: [Douglas J. Feith and Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp (principal drafters)], “Strategic Review: Stay the Course—Faster,” October 28, 2003, 12:15 p.m.

462 “governance, security, and economy”: Feith and Sharp, “Stay the Course—Faster.”

463 a practical good idea: Iraq’s interim constitution: I saw Bremer’s idea of an interim constitution as a variation—and an improvement—on the aspect of the original IIA plan that envisioned an agreement between the IIA and the U.S. government on a bill of rights for later inclusion in the Iraqi constitution. See Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Draft Agreement between the USG and ‘Iraqi Interim Authority’ (IIA),” March 6, 2003, 9:20 a.m.

464 “by late 2004, at best”: Meghan O’Sullivan and Roman Martinez Memo to Bremer on “Overview of Changing Timeline Proposals,” October 28, 2003.

467 or appear to oppose—elections: Rumsfeld Memo to Cheney, Powell, Tenet, Card, and Rice, “Quick thoughts following the January 16 meeting on Iraq,” January 18, 2004.

468 By November 15 he reached an agreement: The November 15 Agreement between the Iraq Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority.

469 “authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense”: President Bush Letter to Bremer, May 9, 2003.

469 In an October 2, 2003 memo . . .: Rice Memo to Cheney, Powell, Snow, Rumsfeld, Card, Bolten, Tenet, and Myers, “Iraq Stabilization Group,” October 2, 2003.

469 The New York Times described the Iraq Stabilization Group: David E. Sanger, “White House to Overhaul Iraq and Afghan Missions,” New York Times, October 6, 2003.

470 Strongly worded memo to the President’s Chief of Staff: Rumsfeld Memo to Card, “Iraq Stabilization Phase Reporting Relationship,” October 6, 2003.

471 another former UNSCOM inspector: Iraq Survey Group, Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004, Vol. 1, “Scope Note,” pp. 1—2.

471 Kay reported preliminary findings to Congress: David Kay, “Kay Report" before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” October 2, 2003 (emphasis in original).

471 “a capability for resuming BW production”: Ibid. The final Duelfer Report confirms the point: Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a course. Duelfer Report, Vol. III, “Biological Warfare”, p. 2 (emphasis in original).

471 “avenue for furthering BW-applicable research”: Kay Report.

472 “have them available when needed”: Duelfer Report, Vol. II, “Nuclear,” p. 132.

472 “or make available chemical weapons”: Kay Report.

474 “justify his decision to go to war”: David E. Sanger, “The Struggle for Iraq: Assessment; A Reckoning: Iraq Arms Report Poses Test for Bush,” New York Times, October 3, 2003, p. A13. The Washington Post story on Kay’s report was headlined: “Search in Iraq Finds No Banned Weapons” (Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, Washington Post, October 3, 2003, p. A1). Similar headlines ran throughout the United States and around the world. See, e.g., “US team finds no Iraq WMD,” BBC News, October 3, 2003; “CIA Chief Weapons Inspector: No WMD Found,” CNN American Morning, October 3, 2003. The misleading headlines helped create the common misimpression that the Kay Report simply confirmed that prewar fears of Saddam’s WMD capabilities were groundless.

474 broader than the concerns about WMD stockpiles: The Congressional Resolution of October 10, 2002, authorized military action against Iraq. Of its eighteen substantive clauses, six focused on WMD and twelve discussed a range of issues (sometimes including WMD). (“Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq.”)

474 wasn’t based only on the idea that Saddam possessed stockpiles: As noted, Administration officials discussed the Iraqi WMD threat as a matter of Saddam’s history of WMD development and use, his intentions, facilities, programs, and capabilities—and not just stockpiles. Examples of this argument abound. In October 2002, President Bush stated:

“By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature of its regime, Iraq is unique. As a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N. has said, ‘The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction.’ . . . If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression.”

Remarks by President Bush on Iraq at the Cincinnati Museum Center—Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002. See also Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002.

475 at a White House South Lawn press event: President George W. Bush, “President Bush, Police Commissioner Kerik Discuss Police Force in Iraq,” October 3, 2003.

475 Rice, addressing the Council on Foreign Relations: Condoleezza Rice, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq in Chicago,” October 8, 2003.

475 Cheney provided a more substantive treatment: Richard Cheney, “Remarks by the Vice President to the Heritage Foundation,” October 10, 2003.

478 Zarqawi wrote an extraordinary letter: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Letter obtained by United States Government in Iraq, February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation.

478 in a February 9, 2004, New York Times story: Dexter Filkins, “The Struggle for Iraq: Intelligence; U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict,” New York Times, February 9, 2004, p. A1.

478 as close affiliates of al Qaida: In his February 5, 2003, speech to the UN Security Council, Powell said:

"Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network, headed by Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants.

"Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan War more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialties and one of the specialties of this camp is poisons.

"When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in Northeastern Iraq. . . .

"Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein’s controlled Iraq, but Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered Al Qaeda safe haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today.

"Zarqawi’s activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These Al Qaeda affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they’ve now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.

"Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with Al Qaeda. These denials are simply not credible. Last year, an Al Qaeda associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was “good,” that Baghdad could be transited quickly. . . .

"From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us at the State Department, and the Agency for International Development, we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last October. . . .

"Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi’s activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.

"And now, let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad; Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go."

 

Colin L. Powell, “Remarks to the United Nations Security Council,” New York City, February 5, 2003.

479 or “al Qaida in Iraq”: See U.S. State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism, April 28, 2006, Chapter 8: “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” section on Al-Qaida in Iraq.

480 “the CPA reported that Sadr was guilty”: See Office of Political Adviser, Coalition Provisional Authority office in Najaf, Iraq, “Muqtada Sadr Chronology,” Information Paper, [undated], circulated to the Principals and others by Frank Miller of National Security Council staff for March 11, 2004 Principals Committee meeting.

480 to try to capture Sadr: On August 18, 2003, Bremer told Rumsfeld during a regular video teleconference that an Iraqi judge might be issuing an arrest warrant for Sadr the next day. Rumsfeld asked how the arrest would be executed and where Sadr would be held—would that be done by Iraqi police or U.S. forces? Bremer did not give Rumsfeld confidence that the potentially large political effects of the arrest had been thought through. After the teleconference, Rumsfeld dictated a list of questions for me to fax to Bremer, emphasizing that he wanted answers “before an operation to detain Sadr is initiated.” Among the questions:

• “Who would detain Sadr and where? What is the process thereafter—how long before trial, then what, etc.?”

 

• “What is your plan to inform and guide Iraqi opinion about the arrest? International opinion?”

 

• “Have you consulted with the Shi’a clerical leadership in the Howza (seminary) in an-Najaf? As you know, Ayatollah Sistani and the Howza are monitoring Sadr’s behavior.”

• “What would be the role—if any—of the Governing Council?”

 

• “Is this something that must be done now? Or can it wait for the results of your campaign to inform Shi’a opinion?”

 

• “How do you plan to consult with the UK?”

 

Feith Memo to Bremer, “Muqtada al-Sadr,” August 18, 2003. According to Bremer, these questions stymied the arrest operation. He gives a fractured account of the story in his book, making no mention of the teleconference and saying that “out of the blue” he received word from Rumsfeld not to arrest Sadr “until further notice.” (I doubt that Rumsfeld ever sent such word to Bremer.) Bremer quotes only one of the questions and says they “repeated the same points that we had already answered many times.” But Bremer had not answered these questions—and, even if he thought he had, Rumsfeld was not satisfied that the CPA was on top of the matter. No one at the Pentagon wanted to be accused—in the standard terminology—of trying to wield a five-thousand-mile-long screwdriver to fine-tune operations in the field. But if the CPA botched Sadr’s arrest and provoked a Shiite uprising, Rumsfeld would be held accountable: He had the obligation to ensure that Bremer was being careful. Bremer had a difficult job, but it would have gone better if he were not so easily exasperated. See Bremer, My Year in Iraq, pp. 135–136.

481 the 36th battalion of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps: CENTCOM Briefing Slides, distributed at April 9, 2004, National Security Council meeting.

486 antagonistic toward Ahmad Chalabi: My staff, in a read-ahead memo for Rumsfeld for a Principals Committee meeting, observed that “Brahimi appears determined to get rid of some GC [Governing Council] members, most notably Ahmed Chalabi.” Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Read Ahead on Ambassador Brahimi’s Mission,” April 20, 2004, 11:00 a.m.

487 intelligence agencies were accusing Chalabi: Mark Hosenball, “Intelligence: A Double Game,” Newsweek, May 10, 2004, p. 30.

488 “are perfect one way or another”: Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, Hardball with Chris Matthews, MSNBC, April 29, 2004.

489 “that intelligence was accurate and useful in many cases”: General Richard Myers, “Operations and Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, May 21, 2004.

489 Los Angeles Times ran a front-page exposé: See Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, “Iraqi Defector’s Tales Bolstered U.S. Case for War: Colin Powell presented the U.N. with details on mobile germ factories, which came from a now-discredited source known as ‘Curveball,’” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 2004, p. A1.

489 “not an explanation for his fabrications”: SSCI Report on Chalabi Group, p. 108.

489 “minimal impact on pre-war assessments”: Silberman-Robb Commission, p. 108, (emphasis added; citations omitted).

490 later dismissed by the Iraqi courts for lack of evidence: See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Iraqi Judge Dismisses Chalabi Case,” Washington Post, September 28, 2004, p. A22.

490 fatal strike against Chalabi’s political ambitions in Iraq: See, e.g., Barbara Slavin, “Former exile’s U.S. supporters seem to have cut him loose,” USA Today, May 21, 2004, p. A4; Jim Hoagland, “Cutting off Chalabi,” Washington Post, May 21, 2004, p. A25; Luke Harding and Julian Borger, “Pentagon protege humiliated as US and Iraqi police raid Baghdad villa: Defiant fall from grace,” The Guardian, May 21, 2004, p. 4.

490 November 2005 meetings would not have occurred: For the December 2005 national elections, Chalabi broke away from the main Shiite party and formed his own party, but failed to win any parliamentary seats. The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki nevertheless asked him to perform some official assignments, and it appears that Chalabi intends to remain active in Iraqi politics. See, e.g., Melik Kaylan, “Survivor: The Weekend Interview,” Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2007.

491 On May 22, I gave Rumsfeld a memo: Douglas J. Feith Memo to Rumsfeld, “President’s Speech on Iraq,” May 22, 2004.

492 the next day I wrote Rumsfeld another set of comments: Douglas J. Feith Memo to Rumsfeld, “Comments on Draft #8 of President’s Speech on Iraq,” May 23, 2004.

493 Wolfowitz endorsed my memo: Paul Wolfowitz E-mail to Feith, “Re: Speech Memo,” May 23, 2004, 11:46 a.m., containing a memo from Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, “Presidential Speech.”

495 respectful comment even from many who opposed the Iraq war: See, e.g., Editorial, “Message from Iraq,” New York Times, January 31, 2005, p. A22:

"Courageous Iraqis turned out to vote yesterday in numbers that may have exceeded even the most optimistic predictions. Participation varied by region, and the impressive national percentages should not obscure the fact that the country’s large Sunni Arab minority remained broadly disenfranchised—due to alienation or terror or both. But even in some predominantly Sunni areas, turnout was higher than expected. And in an impressive range of mainly Shiite and Kurdish cities, a long silenced majority of ordinary Iraqis defied threats of deadly mayhem to cast votes for a new, and hopefully democratic, political order.

 

"This page has not hesitated to criticize the Bush administration over its policies in Iraq, and we continue to have grave doubts about the overall direction of American strategy there. Yet today, along with other Americans, whether supporters or critics of the war, we rejoice in a heartening advance by the Iraqi people. For now at least, the multiple political failures that marked the run-up to the voting stand eclipsed by a remarkably successful election day."

 

497 growing to 1,130 in June 2004: Michael O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post- Saddam Iraq, Brookings Institution, August 13, 2004.

498 and steal their oil: An April 2004 Gallup Poll in Iraq found that nationwide, 71 percent of Iraqis viewed coalition forces as “occupiers” rather than “liberators,” compared to 43 percent at the time of the invasion. (“Key findings: Nationwide survey of 3,500 Iraqis,” April 28, 2004.)

499 looked on U.S. forces favorably: A 2005 ABC News poll in Afghanistan found that 83 percent of Afghans had a favorable view of the United States and 87 percent believed that the Taliban’s ouster was a “good thing”; despite the many challenges facing Afghanistan, 77 percent of Afghans felt their country was moving in the right direction. Gary Langer, “2005 Poll: Four Years After the Fall of the Taliban, Afghans Optimistic About the Future,” ABC News Online, December 7, 2005. 

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