HOME > CITATIONS BY CHAPTER >

Chapter 13: Saddam's Regime Falls

Citations by page number

Click on any link to access the cited document.

391 television broadcast from the White House: George W. Bush, “President says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours,” March 17, 2003.

392 “speed kills”: Garner also discussed the value of speed in a retrospective interview:

"I thought there would be a lot of refugees and displaced people, because I thought [Saddam] would use chemicals. In my heart of hearts, I’ll always believe he intended to. But because of the speed of the military operation, and the fact they went after him the first night, he wasn’t able to do that. They cut all his communications the first night. So he was never able to execute that.

"My second fear was he’d torch all the oil fields. We knew he intended to do that, because they were wired with explosives. But the military got in there so fast."

Interview with General Jay Garner [2003], Frontline, July 17, 2003.

392 Saddam knew we were coming: After Saddam’s overthrow, we learned that we had had a measure of strategic surprise after all: Saddam thought that France’s and Russia’s UN Security Council efforts would prevent the United States from going to war. See Woods, et al., The Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 28. Saddam thought he could avoid a war by admitting UN weapons inspectors and by refusing to take the provocative actions advised by his son—mining the Persian Gulf, destroying Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and preemptively attacking Kuwait. Ibid., p. 29.

"Through the distortions of his ideological perceptions, Saddam simply could not take the Americans seriously. . . . [T]he Americans could not possibly launch a ground invasion that would seriously threaten his regime. . . . Like the First World War generals, Saddam’s conception of military effectiveness revolved around the number of casualties that an army suffered." Ibid. pp. viii–ix, 28.

All these points suggest that Administration officials overestimated the difficulty of achieving surprise. Even in mid-March 2003, Saddam thought he could avert war. Ibid., p. 113. Note that, even if these reports had been available before the war, they might not have been given great weight. Military planners would rightly have been reluctant to make plans on the rosy assumption that our enemy would behave foolishly.

393 “simultaneous air and ground attack”: Woods, et al., The Iraqi Perspectives Project, p. 125 (footnote omitted).

394 “there was never a push inside the Joint Chiefs of Staff for more forces”: See General Richard Myers, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, June 25, 2004.

394 the Turkish parliament failed: See Dexter Filkins, “Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops,” New York Times, March 2, 2003, p. A1. The Turkish government led by Prime Minister Recep Erdogan had endorsed the measure allowing U.S. access, urged the parliament to vote favorably on it, and expected approval. The final vote was 264 to 251 in favor of allowing U.S. access, with 19 abstentions—but that majority was not sufficient under Turkish law to grant approval.

395 historian Victor Davis Hanson has asked: Victor David Hanson, “Refighting the War,” Commentary, June 7, 2006.

396 eventually ran to thirty countries: As of January 2003, thirty countries were playing a role in the coalition: Twenty-five were providing access, basing, and over-flight, and three were providing military forces, while several others were discussing possible participation. Feith Memo to Rumsfeld, “Iraq Coalition Update,” January 30, 2003.

396 among the bloodiest in history: See, e.g., Simon Jenkins, “Baghdad will be near impossible to conquer,” The Times (London), March 28, 2003; Walter Shapiro, “U.S. Should Pay Heed to Iraq’s History,” USA Today, March 28, 2003, p. 11A.

397 “put an Iraqi face”: Memo of conversation with Lieutenant General John Abizaid by Chris Straub, March 26, 2003.

397 “a military component like the Kurdish parties”: Memo from Feith to Wolfowitz, “CENTCOM Military Liaison Officers Assigned to Democratic Iraqi Opposition Groups,” March 3, 2003.

399 “to recruit from all eligible groups”: [Near East and South Asia Affairs office], Office of the Secretary of Defense/Policy Briefing Paper, “Objections Raised by CENTCOM to Ahmed Chalabi’s Participation in Southern Iraq Operation,” April 6, 2003.

400 who cheered and chanted celebratory slogans: The French wire service reported ten thousand people in the crowd. See Agence France Presse, “Baath party must be uprooted forever: Iraqi opposition chief,” April 9, 2003.

402 Iraqis complained publicly about this U.S. policy: See Ahmad Chalabi, “Iraq for the Iraqis,” Wall Street Journal, February 19, 2003; Kanan Makiya, “Our Hopes Betrayed,” The Observer, February 16, 2003.

404 papers we wrote for the Principals’ March 7 meeting: [Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], Briefing Paper for Rumsfeld, “Iraqi Interim Authority,” March 6, 2003, 12:30 p.m. (emphasis added).

405 In our draft proposed agreement . . .: See [Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy], Briefing paper for Rumsfeld, “Draft Agreement between USG and ‘Iraqi Interim Authority’ (IIA),” March 6, 2003, 9:20 a.m.

408 The meeting’s official summary of conclusions: National Security Council, “Summary of Conclusions NSC Meeting on Regional Issues,” March 11, 2003. Though this document shows March 11 as the date of the meeting, my notes show it should be March 10.

410 For a March 31 Principals Committee meeting, Rumsfeld sent: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Iraqi Interim Authority Implementation Concept—Summary,” March 30, 2003.

411 In an April 1 memo to the President: Rumsfeld Memo to President Bush, “Iraqi Interim Authority,” April 1, 2003.

413 By April 4 we had general agreement: The Washington Post account reported on this phase of the IIA process:

“We will work with Iraqis, our coalition partners and international organizations to rebuild Iraq,” Rice said in a briefing arranged on short notice before she left for the presidential retreat at Camp David. “We will leave Iraq completely in the hands of Iraqis as quickly as possible.” Although established exile politicians would appear to have an organizational edge, Rice said coalition troops have begun to identify Iraqis inside the country who can advise U.S. occupation forces. She said the timing for the establishment of an Iraqi interim authority has not been set, but it may precede the end of hostilities. “We’re watching how events are unfolding on the ground,” Rice said. “We’re watching the development of potential leaders—local people, for instance—who are coming out. The most important is events on the ground, but it’s also the emergence of leadership.” . . . “Decision-making will be done in a consultative process, and Iraqis will be deciding a lot among themselves,” said Douglas J. Feith, the Pentagon’s policy director. “Our intention is not to be picking and choosing among Iraqis but arranging a platform on which Iraqi leaders can emerge by some natural process.”

 

Peter Slevin, “U.S. Won’t Install Iraqi Expatriates; Inclusive Interim Authority Is Pledged,” Washington Post, April 5, 2003, p. A28.

413 As late as September 15, 2003, Powell still asserted: In a press conference in Kuwait, Powell emphasized that sovereignty entails a full transfer of governing authority. Colin Powell, Press Briefing at the Kuwait International Airport, Sept. 15, 2003.

 

414 sabotage organized by the ousted Baathists: In Baghdad, Jay Garner observed, “not only did they take everything out of the buildings, but then they pulled all the wiring out of the buildings, they pulled all of the plumbing out of the buildings, and they set it on fire. . . . 17 of the 23 ministries were gone when we got to Baghdad.” Interview with General Jay Garner [2003], Frontline, July 17, 2003. David Kay similarly reported on the “intentional” and “unparalleled” destruction, “designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well.” Testimony of David Kay, former Head of Iraq Survey Group, “Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 28, 2004

415 When the CIA, in August 2002 . . .: Several years after the fact, news reports generated by the Senate Intelligence Committee called attention to a prewar CIA paper that mentioned that “guerrilla warfare” might occur after Saddam’s overthrow. That mention was in a thirty-eight-page National Intelligence Council assessment:

“[R]ogue ex-regime elements could forge an alliance with existing terrorist organizations or act independently to wage guerilla warfare against the new government of Coalition forces.” National Intelligence Council, “Principal Challenges in Post- Saddam Iraq,” January 2003, p. 38.

While the analyst responsible for that sentence deserves some credit, the point was not a major part of the CIA’s message to the Administration about post-Saddam Iraq. The observation appeared at the tail end of the report and was not mentioned in the summary of key points at the front of the paper. The fact that such a sentence appeared among the thousands of pages of material on Iraq produced by the CIA in the year or two before the war does not mean that the Agency duly warned CENTCOM or the Administration generally to prepare for the kind of insurgency coalition forces actually faced. (Despite its lack of prominence in the original report, critics of the Administration on the Senate Intelligence Committee highlighted that sentence in the lead paragraph of the “Terrorism” section of a report they published in July 2004, SSCI Report on Prewar Intelligence, p. 7.)

George Tenet had the good grace in his book to point out that it is misleading to mine for nuggets of this kind in voluminous intelligence materials and then claim that a nugget proves the CIA was on the top of a matter: “It’s tempting to cite this information and say, ‘See. We predicted many of the difficulties that later ensued’— but doing so would be disingenuous. . . . Had we felt strongly that these were likely outcomes, we should have shouted our conclusions.” George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. 318.

416 expresses the free will of the people of Iraq: Lawrence Morahan, “Officials Foresee Role for Regular Iraqi Army in Reconstruction,” CNSNEWS. com, March 11, 2003. ORHA’s “A Unified Plan for Post-Hostilities Iraq,” with an introduction by Jay Garner, states: A rapid and orderly transfer of authority from the international mission to the host nation is of the essence. The process of transformation is driven by the indigenous people and is fuelled by their desire to build a self sustaining peace. An important role for the military is to assist the civil authorities in empowering existing legitimate organizations and dismantling separate or parallel power structures in order to create the basis for Iraqi self-government. Parallel, not sequential, deconstruction and reconstruction underpins transition and transformation. The goal is to set the conditions to enable the rapid transfer of government to the Iraqi people.

 

417 inclusion in a conference declaration: The Nasiriyah conference of April 15, 2003, published the following declaration:

1. Iraq must be democratic.

2. A future government should not be based on communal identity.

3. A future government should be organized as a democratic federal system, but on the basis of countrywide consultation.

4. The rule of law must be paramount.

5. That Iraq must be built on respect for diversity including respect for the role of women.

6. The meeting discussed the role of religion in state and society.

7. The meeting discussed the principle that Iraqis must choose their leaders, not have them imposed from outside.

8. That political violence must be rejected, and that Iraqis must immediately organize themselves for the task of reconstruction at both the local and national levels.

9. That Iraqis and the coalition must work together to tackle the immediate issues of restoring security and basic services.

10. That the Ba’ath party must be dissolved and its effect on society must be eliminated.

11. That there should be an open dialogue with all national political groups to bring them into the process.

12. That the meeting condemns the looting that has taken place and the destruction of documents.

13. The Iraqi participation in the Nasiriyah meeting voted that there should be another meeting in 10 days in a location to be determined with additional Iraqi participants and to discuss procedures for developing an Iraqi interim authority. Associated Press Worldstream, April 15, 2003.

The declarations were formally announced by Wolfowitz. Paul Wolfowitz, Foreign Press Center Briefing on Iraqi Interim Authority, Washington, D.C., April 25, 2003.

417 Chris Straub, of my office, attended and reported: Straub’s report was contained in a memo from Luti to Wolfowitz, “Nasariyah Meeting,” April 15, 2003.

417 Makiya also attended the Nasariyah conference: Kanan Makiya, “Memorandum on My Trip to Iraq and Kuwait,” April 18, 2003.

419 In a paper my office wrote for the Pentagon public affairs office on April 16: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Freedom Message Statement and Q&A,” April 16, 2003 (marked “Draft”).

421 General Myers sent CENTCOM formal guidance from Rumsfeld: General Richard Myers message to CENTCOM, “Implementing Guidance Related to Police and Civil Administration,” April 23, 2003.

421 the participants resolved to create an Iraqi government: See “Coalition, Factions Discuss Iraq’s Political Future,” PBS Online NewsHour, April 28, 2003.

422 President Bush decided to appoint Ambassador L. Paul Bremer: Various commentators at the time (and since) have called Bremer’s appointment a victory by State over Defense in the interagency contest for influence over U.S. Iraq policy. See, e.g., Michael Hirsh, “The State Dept. Wins One,” Newsweek (Newsweek Web Exclusive), April 30, 2003.

422 government of Iraq was now passing from military to civilian hands: The official announcement specified the responsibilities and reporting relationships of the new role:

"Ambassador Bremer will serve as the senior Coalition official in Iraq. In his capacity as Presidential Envoy, he will oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and governing structures that will guide their future. General Tommy Franks will maintain command over Coalition military personnel in the theater. Ambassador Bremer will report to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and will advise the President, through the Secretary, on policies designed to achieve American and Coalition goals for Iraq."

 

Statement by the Press Secretary, “President Names Envoy to Iraq,” May 6, 2003.

423 “best thing. . . is for me to leave after he gets here”: “I think if I’d had 120 days,” Garner continued, “I could have gotten a hell of a lot of stuff done. . . . We would at least have an opportunity to have a different outcome. . . . We could have been very involved and started [the constitutional process]. Instead, we shifted from the Iraqi perception of us being liberators to the Iraqi perception of us being occupiers, and they resented that. The Iraqis are good people, and they’re nice people, but they’re fiercely independent, probably more so than we are. So I don’t think you can take on the mantle of an occupier and last very long.” Interview with General Jay Garner [2006], “The Lost Year in Iraq,” Frontline, PBS, August 11, 2006.

423 In the cover memo we gave Bremer: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Iraqi Interim Authority Overview,” April 28, 2003.

424 The Iraqis had resolved to hold another meeting within four weeks: “Coalition, Factions Discuss Iraq’s Political Future,” PBS Online NewsHour, April 28, 2003. 

TOP OF PAGE