HOME > CITATIONS BY CHAPTER >

Chapter 12: Final Preparations for War and its Aftermath

Citations by page number

Click on any link to access the cited document.

361 might be aggravated by Iraq’s neighbors: See, e.g., briefing on “Immediate Post-War Concerns” for January 16, 2003, Principals Committee meeting, which had a Joint Staff–produced slide entitled “Some Potential Post-War Challenges” warning of (among other items):

• Internal clash between Arabs and Kurds

• Not all WMD accounted for • Unclear status and location of regime leadership

• Flood damage and oil-field fires

• Tribal maneuvering and settling of old scores

• Sunni Officer Corps flees Southern Iraq and consolidates in Sunni heartland

• Regional neighbors seeking to influence

• Internal and expatriate opposition competing for leadership roles

This briefing called attention to the danger of the “fracturing of Iraq or threats to its territorial integrity.”

361 A December 19, 2002, modification of the war-planning order: Richard B. Myers, “Planning Order (PLANORD) For Possible Military Operations in Iraq II PLANORD Modification (MOD) 006,” December 19, 2002.

362 “cannot be met by local manpower”: Feith Memo to Paul Williams [counsel to Bosnian Muslim delegation], “IFOR and Police,” November 16, 1995.

363 “maintaining public order” in Iraq: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans [Christopher Lamb], “Action Memo: Maintaining Public Order during Combat Operations in Iraq ,” February 9, 2003.

363 briefed it to the Deputies Committee at least twice: The basic argument appeared also in the NIC summary of principal challenges: “Local police and the Regular Army are less tainted [than other agencies] by association with Saddam’s rule and could assist in law enforcement.” National Intelligence Council, Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq, January 2003, p. 20 (reprinted as Appendix B of SSCI Report on Prewar Intelligence on Postwar Iraq, May 2007). CENTCOM’s planning drew on this guidance: “Leverage well-rooted police and judiciary systems, which could promote good governance once stripped of their Ba’athist leadership.” United States Central Command, Phase IV IPB, as of March 1, 2003, p 57 (cited in SSCI Report on Prewar Intelligence on Postwar Iraq, p. 96).

364 detract from the success of the operation: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans, “Action Memo: Maintaining Public Order during Combat Operations in Iraq,” February 9, 2003.

365 rejoice when liberated from Saddam’s tyranny: See, e.g., Landay and Strobel, “Plan B for postwar Iraq didn’t exist,” p A01; David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New York Times, November 2, 2003, p. A28; Gerard Baker and Stephen Fidler, “The best-laid plans? How turf battles and mistakes in Washington dragged down the reconstruction of Iraq,” Financial Times, August 4, 2003, p. A15.

366 “Stuff happens”: Department of Defense News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, April 11, 2003.

366 “a plan for rebuilding the Iraqi military”: Office of Near East and South Asia Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” January 21, 2003.

367 Garner’s plan at the March 10, 2003, National Security Council meeting: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Briefing for National Security Council, “Reshaping the Iraqi Military,” February 26, 2003 (briefed at March 10, 2003, meeting).

368 Strategic victory was a larger and more challenging goal: The October 29, 2002, “Goals, Objectives, and Strategy” paper by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice listed the following goals:

"An Iraq that:

• Does not threaten its neighbors;

 

• Renounces support for, and sponsorship of, international terrorism;

 

• Continues to be a single, unitary state;

 

• Is free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery, and associated programs;

 

• No longer oppresses or tyrannizes its people;

 

• Respects the basic rights of all Iraqis—including women and minorities;

 

• Adheres to the rule of law and respects fundamental human rights, including freedom of speech and worship; and

 

• Encourages the building of democratic institutions."

 

These goals were reproduced as strategic guidance in CENTCOM and Joint Staff planning documents.

368 inviting guerilla warfare, terrorism, and political instability: Papers from State and NSC are discussed in Chapter 9. See State Department policy paper, “Diplomatic Plan for the Day After,” [undated], distributed by Richard Armitage at Deputies Lunch, July 25, 2002; [National Security Council Staff], “Liberation Strategy for Iraq,” August 5, 2002, distributed by Rice for August 6, 2002, Principals Committee meeting. In a January 2003 paper, the CIA also warned of the dangers of occupation (though the warning was omitted from the report’s Key Findings), saying that “Iraq’s history of foreign occupation . . . has left Iraqis with a deep dislike of occupiers. An indefinite foreign military occupation, with ultimate power in the hands of a non-Iraqi officer, would be widely unacceptable.” National Intelligence Council, “Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,” January 2003, p. 10, excerpted as Appendix B of the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq, [undated], released May 25, 2007.

369 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Douglas J. Feith, “Post-War Planning,” Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003.

370 Armitage had argued since at least the early summer: “Diplomatic Plan for the Day After,” State Department Policy Paper, [undated], distributed to Deputies on July 25, 2002.

372 pros and cons of an Iraqi provisional government: Department of Defense (Office of the Secretary of Defense/Near East and South Asia Affairs), Briefing Slides on “A Provisional Government for Iraq?” February 14, 2003, 7:28 p.m.

373 participate fully in any structures: Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of Near East and South Asia Affairs, Briefing Paper, “Iraqi Opposition Strategy,” January 31, 2003.

375 Final Report on the Transition to Democracy in Iraq: Conference of the Iraqi Opposition and Democratic Principles Work Group, “Final Report on the Transition to Democracy in Iraq,” November 2002.  

375 Most of the groups produced a report: The final reports were Transitional Justice, Democratic Principles and Procedures, Water, Agriculture and Environment, Public Health and Humanitarian Needs, Defense Policy and Institutions, Local Government, Economy and Infrastructure (Public Finance), Civil Society Capacity Building, Transparency and Anti-Corruption Measures, Education, Free Media, Oil and Energy.

375 ordered Jay Garner and ORHA to ignore it: For example: “An ambitious, yearlong State Department planning effort predicted many of the postwar troubles and advised how to resolve them. But the man who oversaw that effort was kept out of Iraq by the Pentagon, and most of his plans were shelved.” Mark Fineman, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus, “Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace—U.S. Is Paying the Price for Missteps Made on Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2003. See also Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” p. A28; Gerard Baker and Stephen Fidler, “The best-laid plans? How turf battles and mistakes in Washington dragged down the reconstruction of Iraq,” Financial Times, August 4, 2003, p. A15; George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), pp. 124–126.

376 journalists and members of Congress could invoke it without feeling obliged to cite details or sources: Kerry stated, “They left the planning of the State Department in the State Department desks.” Presidential debate, September 30, 2004. For journalists’ accounts, see, e.g., Mike Allen, “Rumsfeld to Remain at Pentagon,” Washington Post, December 4, 2004, p. A1; Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, “Pentagon civilians’ lack of planning contributed to chaos in Iraq,” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, July 13, 2003. Landay and Strobel assert:

"Pentagon planners ignored an eight-month-long effort led by the State Department to prepare for the day when Saddam’s dictatorship was gone. The ‘Future of Iraq’ project, which involved dozens of exiled Iraqi professionals and 17 U.S. agencies, including the Pentagon, prepared strategies for everything from drawing up a new Iraqi judicial code to restoring the unique ecosystem of Iraq’s southern marshes, which Saddam’s regime had drained. Virtually none of the ‘Future of Iraq’ project’s work was used once Saddam fell."

 

Similar inaccurate accusations were made in Congress as well:

"Rep. Van Hollen: . . . But the fact of the matter is, at least at the State Department, there was a plan that had been put together to try to address some of those issues. But that plan was thrown out of the window by Secretary Rumsfeld. And they decided that they were going to do it their own way, rather than abide by that plan."

 

Remarks of Representative Chris Van Hollen (D-Maryland), Hearing on the Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee,  July 11, 2006.

377 they were never intended to be one: John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for the first four years of the George W. Bush Administration, has praised the Future of Iraq Project’s financial report as “helpful in pulling together information and in making initial contacts with people who might be interested in going to Iraq if there were to be a regime change.” But he noted that, “unlike some have claimed, it was by no means a post-war financial plan for Iraq, and I assume that is how it was in other areas.” John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007), pp. 202–203.

Gordon and Trainor provide a similar picture:

"[David] Kay, who read the study, summed it up: “It was unimplementable. It was a series of essays to describe what the future could be. It was not a plan to hand to a task force and say ‘go implement.’ If it had been carried out it would not have made a difference.” [Paul] Hughes agreed. “There is a real lack of planning capacity at the Department of State, hence, just about any study gets labeled a plan,” he said. “While it produced some useful background information it had no chance of really influencing the post-Saddam phase of the war.” Even so, the study was eventually conveyed to the U.S. officials who administered Iraq."

 

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, p. 159.

378 no one did the latter: In a July 2003 interview, Garner did say that Rumsfeld told him “we’re not going to bring Tom Warrick or his work on the team.” Interview with General Jay Garner [2003], Frontline, PBS, July 17, 2003, (emphasis added). Garner sometimes spoke imprecisely, however, and I believe the phrase “or his work” here is not accurate, for the reasons I have explained.

378 as one of its key sources: Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (Post-Conflict Planning Group), Briefing Slides on “Civil Administration Section, Justice/Law Enforcement,” [undated; declassified—DRT March 20, 2005].

378 meetings that Grossman and I cochaired: See “Political Statement of the Iraqi Opposition Conference in London," 14–16 December 2002.

382 vet Iraqis for jobs in the new government: Vetting the Iraqi officials had been a Policy concern for many months, as highlighted in my congressional testimony in February 2003 (Douglas J. Feith, “Post-War Planning,” Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 11, 2003). Eventually a “fusion cell” was created as a clearinghouse for submitting background information, involving FBI, CIA, DIA, CENTCOM, and State. It did not work as planned, and some senior Baathists were hired inadvertently.

383 favoring him over other externals: Rumsfeld made clear to Jay Garner that he did not favor Chalabi. When a PBS journalist asked Garner, as former ORHA director, about “a plan to move Chalabi in to start up a government,” Garner replied that he knew of no such plan and did not believe there was one. He said that some Pentagon officials were “pro-Chalabi” as other U.S. officials were “pro” other Iraqi opposition leaders. But Garner understood Rumsfeld’s position to be “No, Chalabi’s a candidate, but I don’t have a candidate.” Interview with General Jay Garner [2003], Frontline, July 17, 2003.

384 President didn’t sign the necessary funding authorization until December 9: President Bush Memo to Powell and Rumsfeld, “Presidential Determination on Authorization to Furnish Drawdown Assistance to the Iraqi Opposition Under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998,” Dec. 9, 2002.

387 By late February, Garner later said: Interview with General Jay Garner [2003], Frontline, July 17, 2003.

388 phraseology characteristic of Richard Armitage: See Hersh, “The Debate Within,” p. 34. Other observers have remarked that many quotes by anonymous State Department officials resemble Armitage’s speaking style: See Jack Schafer, “Who’s wearing a bag on his head in today’s New York Times?,” Slate, April 19, 2004.

TOP OF PAGE